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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS 
THIS COURT'S REVIEW 
When analyzing whether an applicant's employment 
activities satisfy the unusual or extraordinary standard, only 
the employment exertion actually precipitating the injury should 
be evaluated. Counsel for Ms. Nyrehn would have this Court 
believe that the analysis used by the Utah Court of Appeals in 
this case retains the integrity of the Allen framework and will 
not result in wide-spread abuse. 
With due respect, counsel for Ms. Nyrehn is 
categorically wrong. The Utah Court of Appeals clearly and 
plainly held that the cumulative effect of Ms. Nyrehn1s work 
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, * 
FRED MEYER STORES, LIBERTY MUTUAL * 
INSURANCE and THE EMPLOYERS' * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants/Petitioners, * 
* 
vs. * 
KATHLEEN NYREHN, * 
Applicant-Respondent. * 
activities should have been analyzed for purposes of the legal 
causation test.1 That "cumulative effect analysis" is the sole 
reason why the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the Industrial 
Commission. In the future, all workers with preexisting 
conditions can argue that, based on Nyrehn, the cumulative effect 
of all prior work exertions must be compared to typical 
nonemployment life. Such a result is an obvious misconstruction 
of what this Court intended in Allen. Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n., 729 P.2d at 26. To remedy this misconstruction, the 
Utah Court of Appeals1 decision must be reversed or remanded. If 
remanded, the administrative law judge should be required to 
enter supportable findings of fact as to the specific exertion or 
exertions which actually caused Ms. Nyrehn's injury.2 
xThe Court of Appeals interpreted the Allen legal causation 
test as follows: "The test is not whether the type of exertion 
which caused the injury is unknown in nonemployment life, but 
rather whether the cumulative work-related exertion exceeds the 
normal level of exertion in nonemployment life." Nyrehn, 146 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 56. 
Petitioners acknowledge that the administrative law judge 
stated that Ms. Nyrehn's injury resulted from two-and-one-half 
months of lifting tubs of merchandise. That finding, however, is 
not supported by any medical, physical, or testimonial evidence 
contained in the record. That Ms. Nyrehn admittedly had no prior 
back problems before January 23, 1985 is clear evidence that her 
industrial injury was not the result of two-and-one-half months of 
work but, rather, the result of minimal work exertion on the 
morning of January 23, 1985. 
2 
In Allen, this Court articulated certain public policy 
concerns where a worker enters the work place with preexisting 
conditions. To combat the possibility that the employer would 
become a general health insurer, this Court in Allen implemented 
two safeguards. The first was medical causation; the second was 
the higher standard of legal causation at issue in this case. Id. 
at 26. By virtue of the Utah Court of Appeals' analysis in this 
case, the unusual or extraordinary standard will be diluted to 
the point of extinction. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' 
holding in this case will have a devastating impact upon 
employers' ability to defend against nonmeritorius claims. 
The possibility that this case will be viewed as 
aberrational is nonexistent. The Industrial Commission is 
currently applying the newly modified framework in a number of 
cases in which petitioners' counsel are personally involved. 
Moreover, the Utah Court of Appeals has already cited Nyrehn in 
two subsequent workers' compensation decisions. Stouffer Foods 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 801 P.2d 179 (Utah Ct. App. 
11/09/90); Fred Meyer v. Industrial Comm'n.. 800 P.2d 825 (Utah 
Ct. App. 10/31/90). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' decision 
merits this Court's fullest and immediate attention. 
3 
POINT II 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DECISION WAS 
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL. 
In this case, the administrative law judge expressly 
found that the exertion required by Ms. Nyrehn's job was not 
unusual or extraordinary. (R, at 468.) In doing so, he properly 
took into account the totality of facts including the repetition 
involved in Ms. Nyrehn's job.3 The Industrial Commission then 
affirmed the administrative law judge's findings. R. at 536.) 
Although the decision of the administrative law judge 
and the Industrial Commission was clearly articulated and 
supported by ample evidence, the Court of Appeals found that the 
Industrial Commission's decision exceeded the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality. Nyrehn, 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
56. In doing so, the court admittedly granted no deference to 
the Industrial Commission and simply ignored the standard of 
review by which it is legally bound. As such, the Utah Court of 
3The administrative law judge stated: "Now, this particular 
case has some interesting facts that give it a different twist, and 
that is the fact that there is repetition involved more so than the 
weight itself. . . . The weight [in this case was] anywhere from 
15 to 40 pounds. Now, what this Administrative Law Judge has got 
to do [sic] is compare whether that is normal exertion . . . . I 
have to agree with the Defendants' position that the activities of 
Ms. Nyrehn on January 23rd, 1985, do not satisfy the higher 
standard. . . . [The crucial issue is] whether something unusual 
happened, some extraordinary exertion happened and in this case, 
the applicant has failed to establish that." (R. at 455-458.) 
4 
Appeals impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the 
Industrial Commission. Accordingly, the Utah Court of Appeals 
departed from its statutory authority. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the "reasonable and rational11 standard of review 
and the Industrial Commission's familiarity with the work 
environment, the Court of Appeals erred in admittedly failing to 
grant any deference to the Industrial Commission. 
The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in its 
misinterpretation of Allen by comparing the cumulative effect of 
two-and-one-half months of Ms. Nyrehn's job-related exertions to 
the normal level of exertion in nonemployment life. Therefore, 
this Court should either (1) reverse the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals; or (2) remand this matter for a finding of fact 
as to that exact exertion which actually caused Ms. Nyrehn's 
injury on January 25, 1985. That exertion should then be 
compared with the unusual, extraordinary standard. 
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